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When Indiana Governor Mike Pence signed Indiana’s version of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) into law on March 26, it kicked up a firestorm of controversy and is already seeing a wave of
backlash, such as the City of San Francisco banning any work-related travel to the state, Salesforce Inc.
publicly cancelling any programs that require people to enter Indiana, and a variety of other public
criticisms sounding the same general concern that this bill is creating a “license to discriminate” or that it is
blatantly “anti-gay.” This backlash seems set to continue further with the potential passage of a similar bill
in Arkansas.
But is the rhetoric regarding the Indiana law and the Arkansas bill justified? To assess this question, we
should look at context this legislation originally arose from, how similar laws have been applied in other
jurisdictions, and whether these iterations of the law are different from other versions in a way that raises
special concerns. Doing this, it will become clear that, on the whole, while there are other laws1 out there
directly keyed to the LGBT issues, characterizing these pieces of legislation as authorizing discrimination is
unjustified.
Where did RFRA come from?
One fact that might support claims that either Indiana’s law or Arkansas’ bill is anti-gay would be if the
language of these legislative acts was just a neutral-sounding veneer over discriminatory
motivation. However, the language used in both cases is virtually identical to a family of similar bills
adopted by 19 other States and the federal government running all the way back to 1993, and this larger
context defies categorization in such a fashion.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act started out its life as a federal law passed as a strongly bipartisan
reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith (a case I previously discussed
as one of Five U.S. Supreme Court Cases Every Christian Should Be Aware Of ). In passing this law, the
near unanimous opinion of Congress was that the government would need to show that it had used the
least restrictive means of advancing a compelling governmental interest in order to place a substantial
burden on someone’s free exercise of their religion. In plain English, this law made it more difficult for state
or federal law to limit the ability of individuals to live their lives in accordance with their religious beliefs. In
practical terms, this law was explicitly designed to wind back the clock to the judicial standard that had
been in place before Smith.
In 1997 in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court determined that RFRA could restrict the federal
government, but the law would not apply to the states. In reaction to both Smith and Flores, 20 states have
since adopted their own versions of RFRA, with the vast majority of them drawing their language very
closely along the lines of the federal statute.2 As the chart shows, the passage of these state laws has
continued at a slow, rolling pace since the federal law was first passed (with a spike of adoptions right after
Flores), and the progressive trend of adoption provides counterevidence to the notion that this legislation is
part of a recent pro-discrimination effort.
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in 2000. This act is structured slightly
differently in order to sustain constitutional challenge, and it focuses specifically on zoning issues and the
religious rights of inmates, two of the most litigious concerns RFRA had tried to address. As of yet, this law
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has been held to apply to both the federal government and the states within this limited scope. This second
measure provides further clarity as to what these legislative efforts function primarily to address.
Given all of this context, there’s no warrant to claim that Indiana’s law was passed out of some recent swell
of anti-gay animus or
that it reflects a
unique inhospitality of
the State, and the
same thing is true of
Arkansas’ bill. Instead,
this legislation is well-
seated in the context
of a significant body of
similar laws aimed at
protecting free
exercise in a general
sense.
How has RFRA been
applied?
Even if RFRA was
born out of different
concerns, criticism
might be justified if the
history of its various
enactments led to either nearly automatic religious exemptions or a pattern of regularly justifying
discrimination. In other words, perhaps anti-gay groups are here taking up a tool that, while couched in
neutral terms and other considerations, has a history of enabling discrimination. As we will see, this is not
the case.
Smith held that Oregon was not constitutionally required to provide a religious exemption from its criminal
drug laws for the sacramental use of peyote by members of the Native American Church. A related case in
1988, Lying v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association , had already said the government did not
impose on free exercise by building a paved road through sacred tribal lands. RFRA was, at its inception,
born out of a bipartisan legislative desire to limit future or ongoing harms like these.
However, raising the hurdle that the government has to clear when burdening religious exercise is a far cry
from saying that the law creates the blanket religious exceptions that the “license to discriminate” rhetoric
implies. As prominent UCLA Law Professor Eugene Volokh points out, even though the pre-Smith standard
sounded like “strict scrutiny,” (a test of the constitutionality of laws often called “strict in theory, fatal in fact”)
many laws were found to pass the compelling interest and least restrictive means tests.
By all appearances, this seems to still be the case when it comes to how courts have viewed the various
RFRA laws. For instance, while the sacramental use of peyote is protected, Arizona courts (along with
many other states) have rejected a similar religious exemption for marijuana usage.3 Pennsylvania ruled
that, despite their religious confidentiality, the Allentown Diocese had to turn over internal documents
regarding the behavior of one of their priests for limited review in a murder trial.4 Finally, and probably most
prominently, New Mexico (who, it should be pointed out, has a slightly different version of RFRA) rejected
an appeal to its version of the law when a photography company was sued for refusing to photograph a
gay wedding.5
The various iterations of this law have been around for some time, and it’s important to note that cases
based on these laws have certainly been raised successfully. Probably most controversially, RFRA was
found to protect the closely-held Hobby Lobby Corporation from being required to provide contraceptive
coverage that the owners believed to cause abortion.6 However, these cases have overwhelmingly not
been used to permit private discrimination based on sexual orientation.7 Based on this history, there is no
warrant to claim that RFRA, in general terms, is really just a “license to discriminate,” and even if the
reason for the success of these specific bills was the hope that they would be, there’s ample reason to be
skeptical of their suitability for that task.
Is this version of RFRA different?
The final question, then, is whether there is something unique about these specific enactments of RFRA
that, as the Human Rights Campaign has said, sends “a dangerous and discriminatory message.” As
summarized by University of Toledo Law Professor Howard Friedman, the primary differences from federal
law (the original RFRA) and Indiana’s law are that it (1) defines protected entities to include corporations,
(2) permits the law to be invoked when a person’s exercise of religion is “likely” to be burdened, and (3)
permits claiming protection under the law when the government is not a party.
As pointed out by Josh Blackman, Assistant Professor of Law at the South Texas College of Law, the first
difference arguably makes no major change from federal law, particularly in the wake of Hobby Lobby, and
the second difference doesn’t appear to be substantive. The final difference may hold some water,
primarily because it would prevent a reviewing court from concluding that RFRA didn’t apply, the
conclusion the New Mexico Supreme Court reached in Elane Photography.
However, this third difference is at best a potential concern and not a new one at that. As mentioned
above, application of RFRA is not a guarantee of religious exemption, and, as many of the sources I’ve
linked to in this article point out, courts have proven unlikely to okay religious exemptions that impose
harms (such as discrimination) on others.8 Secondly, an existing split in U.S. Courts of Appeals means that
this third difference is the current state of the law in many districts, and it has not yet been turned into a
blanket “license to discriminate” in any of them.9
The Arkansas bill is largely similar to the Indiana enactment. The noticeable differences are (1) the bill
provides for the payment of damages and attorney’s fees when the government is a party to litigation, (2)
the bill exempts the State correctional system, and (3) the bill characterizes the enactment as a “state of
emergency.”
The third difference is a matter of rhetoric which does not affect the substance of the bill, while the second
difference demonstrates an exemption which, to the extent Arkansas takes federal funds for its correctional
system, makes no legal difference. The first difference is substantive, but it doesn’t change the judicial
standard being applied, and unclear drafting may mean it only applies when the State is a party (that is, it
provides relief when the State is found to be directly infringing someone’s rights). Any or all of these
differences are, of course, also subject to change as part of the consideration of the bill by the Arkansas
Senate.
In sum, these legislative acts do have some minor differences from the federal law, but they are not unique
differences from RFRA in other states (or, indeed, in its application in some federal courts), and the history
of the application of the law in these other contexts therefore suggests that there is nothing unique about
either Indiana’s law or Arkansas’ bill that empowers it as a tool of discrimination.
Conclusion
For these reasons, as well as all of those mentioned above, it simply isn’t correct to portray the legislative
action taken by Indiana or under consideration in Arkansas as an open affront to gay rights. I am not
situated to speculate with any great insight as to why this particular line of rhetoric has been taken up, but
it smacks to me of a version of the “culture wars” mentality that is common in some Christian circles. Some
prominent advocacy groups on both sides have taken the rhetorical position that this is an “us v. them”
battle in which anything good for religion is bad for the LGBT community (and vice versa), but this simply
isn’t reality. While Christians are not innocent in the development of this perception, I can’t help but think
that LGBT advocates risk doing more harm than good to their cause with such an extreme and adversarial
response to the mere chance that a law with a history of enactment and enforcement that has nothing to
do with gay rights issues might be enforced in some instances against their interests. It is tragic that a law
designed to increase religious freedom (originally for Native Americans, remember) is being cast as a
“license to discriminate,” and if either side thinks that’s what RFRA is, they are seriously mistaken.
Footnotes
1. For instance, there have been bills considered by other states, such as one passed by the Kansas
House of Representatives (Kansas House Bill 2453), which are clearly targeted at permitting
businesses to deny service to same sex couples; however, these bills have, like the Kansas bill,
failed to pass into law. ↩
2. See the chart below for adoption dates and links to statutory text for each law.
Adoption of RFRA by States
State First Adopted State First Adopted
Connecticut Jun. 29, 1993 Oklahoma Jun. 1, 2000
Rhode Island Jul. 22, 1993 Pennsylvania Dec. 9, 2002
Florida Jun. 17, 1998 Missouri Jul. 9, 2003
Illinois Jul. 1, 1998 Virginia Apr. 4, 2007
Arizona May 19, 1999 Tennessee Jul. 1, 2009
South Carolina Jun. 1, 1999 Louisiana Jun. 30, 2010
Texas Aug. 30, 1999 Kentucky Mar. 27, 2013
Alabama Nov. 3, 1999 Kansas Jul. 1, 2013
Idaho Mar. 31, 2000 Mississippi Jul. 1, 2014
New Mexico Apr. 12, 2000 Indiana Mar. 26, 2015
 ↩
3. Arizona v. Hardesty, 222 Ariz. 363 (2009). ↩
4. Pennsylvania v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277 (1997) (decided prior to Flores). ↩
5. Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (New Mexico 2013). ↩
6. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). ↩
7. My research has not turned up a single case where this was successfully claimed. ↩
8. See, for instance, Volokh’s excellent article and Indiana University Law Professor Daniel Conkle’s
article. To be fair, courts have divided on issues such as renting apartments to unmarried
heterosexual couples, so it is conceivable that Indiana could permit discrimination, but its courts
have not done so yet. ↩
9. For a breakdown of the Circuit rules, see Shruti Chaganti, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act Provides a Defense in Suits by Private Plaintiffs, 99 Va. L. Rev. 343 (2013). ↩
